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Social redistribution of pain and 
money
Giles W. Story1,2, Ivo Vlaev3, Robert D. Metcalfe4, Molly J. Crockett2,6, Zeb Kurth-Nelson5, 
Ara Darzi1 & Raymond J. Dolan2
People show empathic responses to others’ pain, yet how they choose to apportion pain between 
themselves and others is not well understood. To address this question, we observed choices to 
reapportion social allocations of painful stimuli and, for comparison, also elicited equivalent choices 
with money. On average people sought to equalize allocations of both pain and money, in a manner 
which indicated that inequality carried an increasing marginal cost. Preferences for pain were more 
altruistic than for money, with several participants assigning more than half the pain to themselves. 
Our data indicate that, given concern for others, the fundamental principle of diminishing marginal 
utility motivates spreading costs across individuals. A model incorporating this assumption 
outperformed existing models of social utility in explaining the data. By implementing selected 
allocations for real, we also found that while inequality per se did not influence pain perception, 
altruistic behavior had an intrinsic analgesic effect for the recipient.
Social inequality is a near universal feature of human experience. Nevertheless, people often appear moti-
vated to reduce inequality, for example increased wealth drives charitable action1,2, and relative poverty 
is associated with acquisitive crime3. A teleological explanation for such behavior is that people are con-
cerned with achieving a fair (equitable) social distribution of benefits4. The latter is often approximated 
as a subjective cost associated with having either more or fewer resources than others, termed inequality 
aversion5–9.
Many experimental studies have examined how humans redress monetary inequality. A common 
observation is that within a scenario referred to as the ‘dictator game’, people endowed with money fre-
quently share a portion with others in the absence of direct return for themselves2,4,10,11. Similarly people 
will take money from those endowed with more money than themselves10,12. By contrast, how humans 
respond to unequal allocations of pain between themselves and others is little studied.
Commensurate with documented empathic responses to pain in others13–15, participants take on pain-
ful stimuli to relieve the apparent suffering of a confederate16,17. Furthermore, a study implementing a 
dictator game with painful outcomes found that participants were particularly egalitarian, allocating on 
average 48% of the pain (time spent immersing one’s hand in ice water) to themselves, while in a mon-
etary dictator game the same participants were significantly less charitable, donating only 30% of the 
endowment on average18. These findings might suggest that people are more inequality-averse for pain 
than money, in other words that people particularly dislike having either more or less pain than others. 
However an alternative possibility is that people are simply more altruistic for pain than for money, in 
the sense that relieving others’ of their physical suffering carries greater motivational weight than does 
increasing others’ wealth.
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In support of the idea that pain evokes particularly altruistic responses, a recent study found that 
participants demanded higher monetary compensation in return for an increase in another participant’s 
pain than for an increase in their own pain19. The latter behavior, referred to as ‘hyperaltruism’, was taken 
to imply that participants in fact assigned greater disvalue to harming others than to harming themselves. 
In a pain dictator game, hyperaltruistic participants ought to take on more pain than they allocate the 
other player; indeed in the dictator game study described above, 30% of participants retained more than 
half the pain, while only 2% gave away more than half the money18.
A key question emerges, namely how can a putative preference for equal allocations of pain be rec-
onciled with hyperaltruism? A key aim of the current study was to address this question by comparing 
the ability of alternative social utility models to account for behavior in a modified pain dictator game. 
Importantly, models of social utility which solely implement an heuristic penalty for inequality5,6 cannot 
account for hyperaltruism. These models assume that people derive utility from the size of their own 
payoff, but incur a utility cost to having either more or fewer resources than others. Under the simplest 
of such models6, both sources of utility are assumed to be linear. Such a model predicts that in dicta-
tor games with an endowment of reward people should either retain all an endowment for themselves 
(offering nothing to the other player) or split the endowment equally. This model cannot account for 
the finding that in dictator games many people choose other allocations that are neither maximally self-
ish nor maximally equal ones10, of which hyperaltruistic allocations for pain are an example18. A more 
nuanced account implements a non-linear penalty for inequality5. This model allows for a preference in 
dictator games to offer the other player something less than half of the endowment, but is nevertheless 
unable to account for hyperaltruistic offers. Here we show that both hyperaltruism and equality-seeking 
can be accounted for within a social utility model in which the utility of one’s own and others’ payoffs are 
combined in a weighted sum20, but where each are non-linear in the size of the payoff (obey diminishing 
marginal utility for rewards and increasing marginal disutility for pain). Under this model, given that 
people have some degree of concern for others, inequality aversion derives from the more fundamental 
principle of diminishing marginal utility over individual payoffs.
The conventional dictator game setup is not ideally suited to disambiguating alternative models of 
social utility, since it provides information only about a person’s preferred allocation, and does not allow 
for an estimate of how a person values different degrees of pain inequality (pertinent for example to 
whether inequality carries a linear or non-linear cost). To address this, we implemented a modified dic-
tator game with mildly painful cutaneous electric shocks as the outcomes, where participants were given 
an opportunity to leave unchanged or adjust default allocations of 24 shocks between themselves and an 
anonymous recipient. Adjustments could be made by giving or taking fixed numbers of shocks. Three 
‘action frames’ were implemented: a Give frame, a Take frame and a Give or Take frame, with names 
corresponding to the permissible actions (Fig.  1). By observing how frequently participants adjusted 
the default allocations at differing levels of inequality, we could map a pattern of inequality aversion for 
pain, albeit coarsely.
We also aimed to test an hypothesis, supported by previous studies, that people are more altruistic 
when allocating pain, compared with money. To do so, in a subset of participants, we implemented an 
equivalent set of choices with monetary outcomes where, in two sub-conditions, these choices were 
framed as either gains or losses of money, where losses were implemented as debts to be repaid from 
an endowment. We compared allocations of monetary losses (debt) with those of pain, since these con-
ditions were matched for valence. We predicted that participants would adjust the default allocations 
in the direction of equality for both pain and debt; based on greater altruism for pain than money in 
standard dictator games18, we predicted that participants would allocate more debt than pain to the 
other participant. Finally, based on existing findings of hyperaltruism for pain18,19 we also predicted that 
hyperaltruism would be more prevalent for pain than for debt.
In addition to the above, as it is known that social comparison can influence responses to reward9,21,22, 
we were interested in whether and how pain inequality influences pain perception. In the real world per-
ceived pain inequality is likely to result from subjective judgments of pain. Therefore, if disadvantageous 
inequality were to increase pain perception, this might engender positive feedback, whereby disadvanta-
geous inequality increases subjective pain, which in turn increases perceived pain inequality, and so on. 
Such feedback might contribute, for example, to the maintenance of chronic pain syndromes. Providing 
indirect support for this idea, amongst sufferers of chronic pain, perceived injustice is known to be 
associated with greater subjective pain and disability23,24. We therefore tested the hypothesis that advan-
tageous inequality reduces pain perception, while disadvantageous inequality increases it. Based also on 
existing findings showing that social rejection and physical pain have overlapping representations23–29 
a further prediction is that pain resulting from the benevolent actions of another person is perceived 
as less severe than an equivalent unintentional pain, and vice versa. Two previous studies support this 
prediction, though these studies did not directly test an effect of inequality30,31.
To test the above hypotheses, we implemented selected allocations of pain for real, attributing them 
either to the play of chance or to the decisions of the dictator (shown in Fig. 2), and then asked subjects to 
rate the intensity of the painful stimuli. Since this experiment was performed in the same participants as 
took part in the pain dictator game, and since outcomes of the dictator game were restricted to a discrete 
set of possible allocations, we could inform participants in good faith that the experienced allocations 
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attributed to the decisions of the other player had indeed been chosen by the other player (albeit not 
necessarily in the same proportions as presented, a fact which participants were also informed of).
Results
Dictator Behavior. Distribution of Mean Offers. The distribution of offers across participants (tak-
ing the mean resulting offer over all three action frames for each participant) is displayed in Fig.  3 
for pain (Fig.  3a) and money (Fig.  3b for losses, 3c for gains). Across participants the mean offer of 
shocks was not significantly different from 12 shocks (N = 47; mean = 12.16, permutation test, p > 0.25, 
see Methods), indicating a preference for equal allocations of pain at the group level. By contrast the 
mean offer of money (averaged across gain and loss frames) was significantly below £12 (N = 25; 
mean = £11.39, p = 0.011, two-tailed permutation test), indicating a degree of self-oriented behavior for 
monetary outcomes.
To compare the degree of self-oriented behavior for money and shocks we focused on comparing 
offers in pain and money loss conditions, since these were matched for valence. As predicted, offers 
of shocks were significantly lower than offers of debt (mean shocks offered in 25 subjects performing 
money choices = 11.98, mean debt offered = £12.98; p = 0.021, two-tailed permutation test, uncorrected; 
p = 0.042 Bonferroni corrected for two possible comparisons, pain vs money gain or pain vs money 
loss). Surprisingly there was no significant difference between the mean offers in pain and money gain 
conditions (mean money retained by dictator = £12.24; p > 0.250), nor was there a difference between 
money gain and money loss conditions (p > 0.250).
Figure 1. Modified Pain Dictator Game. (a) In each of three possible action frames the dictator was given 
the opportunity to alter or leave unchanged default allocations of 24 brief, moderately painful, cutaneous 
electric shocks between themselves and another participant, termed the Receiver. In a Give frame the 
dictator could choose to either give six of their allocated shocks to the Receiver, or leave the allocation 
unchanged. In a Take frame the Dictator could choose to either take on six of the Receiver’s shocks, or 
leave the allocation unchanged. In a Give or Take frame both giving and taking options were available, as 
well as the option to leave the default unchanged. (b) Choice options within each frame. Allocations are 
in the format [shocks for Dictator—shocks for Receiver]. The number of shocks allocated to the Receiver, 
highlighted in bold, was termed the ‘offer’. Asterisks indicate the default allocation (which would result if 
participants chose ‘leave unchanged’). We also implemented equivalent choices for money, in which shocks 
were simply replaced with sums of money in pounds sterling (money gain condition) or with amounts of 
debt in pounds sterling (money loss condition). Since debt in the money loss condition was subtracted from 
an endowment of £24, the net allocations under the two conditions were equivalent. In both forms of the 
task a selection of choices were implemented.
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We note that, given the restricted nature of the choices, this analysis based on mean offers might not 
be the most sensitive for detecting changes in altruism between modalities. Nevertheless, taken together 
these results indicate that participants were most altruistic when apportioning pain, and least altruistic 
when apportioning debt. We perform additional analysis on the raw choice frequencies below, by com-
paring responses to advantageous and disadvantageous inequality for pain and debt.
We tested for hyperaltruism by examining the frequency with which dictators gave away less than 
half of the shocks, or more than half of the money. For pain allocations, 15 out of 47 participants (32%) 
retained more than half the shocks across all choices, indicating hyperaltruistic behavior. By contrast, in 
the money loss frame, only 3 out of 25 participants (12%) assigned more than half of the money to the 
receiver (one-sided Fisher’s exact test p = 0.054).
Inequality Aversion for Pain and Money. To examine the pattern of social preferences in more 
detail, we analyzed the frequency with which participants altered the default allocations as inequality 
Figure 2. Experiential Phase: Trial Structure for Receivers. (a) On Shocks for you: Chance trials 
participants were informed that the outcomes would only be relevant to them, and did not involve the 
other participant. The computer then selected an allocation of shocks at random. The participant received 
the stated number of shocks and was then asked to rate the intensity of the shocks on a visual analogue 
scale. We subsequently elicited participants’ willingness to pay to avoid three further repeats of the same 
outcome (not shown in this figure). (b) Split Shocks: Chance trials proceeded in the same manner, though 
in this case the computer ‘randomly’ chose how to allocate 24 shocks between the two participants. (c) The 
trial structure was identical in Split Shocks: Partner Decides trials, though on these trials the Receiver was 
informed that an allocation chosen by their partner would be selected and played for real.
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changed. In the Take frame participants were increasingly likely to take a fixed number of shocks from the 
other participant as the default number of shocks allocated to the other participant increased (Fig. 4a). 
Similarly in the Give frame, participants became less likely to give shocks to the other participant as the 
baseline number of shocks allocated to the other participant increased (Fig. 4b). An equivalent effect was 
seen in the Give or Take frame (Fig. 4c,d). In the monetary domain a similar effect was also observed 
(Fig. 5). Importantly, this particular pattern is in keeping with an increasing marginal effect of inequality, 
since the propensity to correct inequality by the same degree, 6 shocks, increased as the baseline level of 
inequality increased (from 6–18 to 0–24 in the Take frame, and from 18–6 to 24–0 in the Give frame).
Self-oriented Preferences for Monetary Losses but not Pain. To further compare social pref-
erences for debt and pain at the group level, we separated choices (in the Give and Take action frames) 
which entailed disadvantageous inequality (24–0 vs 18–6, 18–6 vs 12–12) from those which entailed 
advantageous inequality (6–18 vs 0–24, 12–12 vs 6–18). Here, choosing the more equal option in ‘disad-
vantageous’ choices more frequently than in the symmetrical ‘advantageous’ choices indicates a degree 
of self-oriented behavior. This analysis creates a three-way factorial design with two outcome modalities 
(debt vs pain), two action frames (Give vs Take) and two directions of inequality (advantageous vs disad-
vantageous). A main effect of modality would indicate greater or lesser inequality aversion for pain com-
pared with debt irrespective of the direction of inequality. By contrast a modality x inequality-direction 
interaction would indicate more or less altruistic behavior for pain.
Three-way repeated measures ANOVA on the probability of choosing the more equal option (termed 
equality-seeking) for the 25 participants who made choices for both modalities revealed a significant 
main effect of inequality-direction (F(1,24) = 4.616, p = 0.042), driven by some degree of self-oriented 
behavior irrespective of modality or action frame (estimated marginal mean equality-seeking = 0.745 for 
advantageous choices, 0.872 for disadvantageous choices). There was neither a significant main effect of 
modality (F(1,24) = 0.183, p > 0.250), nor a significant main effect of action (F(1,24) = 2.348, p = 0.139). 
Importantly, as predicted, there was a significant interaction between modality and inequality-direction 
(F(1,24) = 6.233, p = 0.020). Follow-up non-parametric tests (by randomly reshuffling condition assign-
ment) indicated that this was driven by greater self-oriented behavior for debt than for pain. When 
allocating debt participants were on average 26% more likely to choose the more equal option in disad-
vantageous choices than in advantageous choices (mean difference = 0.26, two-tailed p < 0.001, N = 25). 
By contrast, for pain there was no significant difference in equality-seeking between disadvantageous and 
Figure 3. Distribution of Mean Resulting Dictator Game Offers. Histograms summarizing the distribution 
of mean resulting dictator game offers, averaged across all choices made by each participant. In each case 
the horizontal axis represents an increasing measure of self-oriented behavior. (a) Pain dictator game, mean 
offers of shocks by all 47 participants, (b) pain dictator game, mean offers of shocks made by 25 participants 
who also completed monetary choices, (c) money dictator game, mean offers of debt in the loss frame, 
(d), money dictator game, mean money retained by the dictator in the gain frame. Offers are out of a total 
endowment of 24 shocks (a,b) or £24 (c,d).
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advantageous choices (mean difference < 0.01, two-tailed p > 0.250, N = 25). Furthermore, the observed 
asymmetry for debt was significantly greater than that for pain (two-tailed p = 0.018, N = 25).
The above analysis also revealed a significant interaction between action frame and inequality direc-
tion (F(1,24) = 14.605, p = 0.001). Follow-up permutation testing indicated that this was driven by more 
self-oriented behavior in the Take frame than in the Give frame (difference in mean inequality-direction 
effect  = 0.27, two-tailed p < 0.001). Since default offers of debt or pain to the other participant were 
higher in the Take frame, this effect is consistent with a status quo bias in dictator behavior. As described 
below a status quo bias was also evident in the mean offers across all three outcome modalities. The 
remaining interactions in the three-way ANOVA (between modality and action frame, and the three-way 
interaction) were not significant (F(1,24) = 0.660, p = 0.424 and F(1,24) = 0.604, p = 0.444 respectively).
Status Quo Bia. Owing to the nature of the choices in this study, in which an initial allocation could 
either be accepted or altered, we expected to observe a status quo bias, reflecting an overall reluctance 
Figure 4. Dictator Behavior for Pain as a Function of Default Allocations. For each plot a single data 
point represents a mean choice probability across 47 participants; error bars are 95% confidence intervals 
around the mean, generated by re-sampling the data 100,000 times with replacement. (a) The probability, in 
the Take frame, that dictators chose to take 6 shocks from the receiver’s allocation (decreasing the resulting 
offer by 6 shocks), as opposed to leaving the allocation unchanged, is plotted as a function of the initial 
allocation of shocks to the receiver (the default offer). Dictators were increasingly likely to take shocks from 
the receiver as the initial allocation to the receiver increased, consistent with an increasing marginal cost to 
having fewer shocks than the receiver. (b) The probability, in the Give frame, that dictators chose to give 6 
of their allocated shocks to the receiver (increasing the resulting offer by 6 shocks) is plotted as a function 
of the initial allocation of shocks to the receiver (the default offer). Dictators were increasingly likely to 
give shocks to the receiver as the initial allocation to the receiver decreased, consistent with there being 
an increasing marginal cost to having more shocks than the receiver. Similarly, in the Give or Take frame, 
the probability that dictators chose to take 6 shocks from the receiver’s allocation increased as the initial 
allocation to the receiver increased (c), and the probability that dictators chose to give 6 of their shocks to 
the receiver decreased as the initial allocation to the receiver increased (d).
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to change the current state of affairs32–34. A status quo bias predicts higher offers in the Take relative to 
the Give frame, since default offers are higher in the Take frame. As displayed in Fig. 6, mean offers in 
the Take frame were indeed significantly higher than those in the Give frame, for both pain (p < 0.001, 
two-tailed permutation test), money gains (p < 0.001) and money losses (p < 0.001).
Figure 5. Dictator Behavior for Money as a Function of Default Allocations. For each plot a single data 
point represents a mean choice probability across 25 participants; error bars are 95% confidence intervals 
around the mean, generated by re-sampling the data 100,000 times with replacement. (a) The probability (in 
the Take frame) that dictators chose to take £6 from the receiver, as opposed to leaving the offer unchanged, 
is plotted as a function of the initial net (default) offer, indicated by green diamonds. Also plotted is the 
probability (in the Give frame) that dictators chose to give £6 of debt to the receiver, indicated by the purple 
triangles. In both cases, dictators were increasingly likely to reduce the offer as the initial offer increased, 
consistent with there being an increasing marginal cost to having less money than the receiver. (b) The 
probability (in the Give frame) that dictators chose to give £6 to the receiver, as opposed to leaving the offer 
unchanged, is plotted as a function of the net default offer, indicated by green squares. Also plotted is the 
probability (in the Take frame) that dictators chose to take £6 of debt from the receiver, indicated by purple 
circles. In both cases, dictators were increasingly likely to increase the offer as the initial offer decreased, 
consistent with an increasing marginal cost to having more money than the receiver. Similarly, in the Give or 
Take frame, the probability that dictators chose to decrease the net offer by £6, either by taking money ( ) 
or giving debt ( ) increased as the initial offer increased (c), and the probability that dictators chose to 
increase the net offer by £6, either by giving money ( ) or taking debt ( ) decreased as the initial offer 
increased (d). A tendency towards self-oriented choices is evident from the greater propensity to decrease 
rather than increase offers, for the same degree of inequality.
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Modeling Dictator Behavior. In the above analyses, concepts such as inequality aversion and hyp-
eraltruism are referred to without their being formally defined. To make the meaning of these concepts 
more explicit, and therefore less susceptible to logical error, we next compared alternative models of 
social utility in accounting for the observed choices. In particular we sought to test a simple form of 
social welfare preference that is capable of accounting for both hyperaltruism and inequality aversion. 
Under this model, termed social discounting, a person’s social utility is given by a weighted sum of their 
own utility and that of others, shown here for the two-person case:
κ( , ) = ( ) + ⋅ ( ) ( )U s s u s u s 1SD i j i i j j
Here ( , )U s sSD i j  is a social utility function governing the utility to player i of an allocation with payoff si  
to player i and sj to player j, u(s) is a utility function over individual payoffs and κ is a social discounting 
parameter which governs the contribution of player j’s payoff. If u(s) is concave for both gains and losses 
(decreasing marginal utility for gains and increasing marginal utility for losses/harms) then, for κ > 0 the 
above function predicts a tendency to spread the payoff across individuals. This has an intuitive interpre-
tation as a motive to give to those most in need. Owing to concave utility, individuals with lower payoffs 
will value the same increase in their payoff more than individuals with higher payoffs.
Predictions of this model are displayed in Fig. 7, for the special case where ui and uj are concave and 
identical (the same form of utility function for payoffs to self and other). Where κ < 1, player i will assign 
more weight to their own payoff than those of the other player, and therefore is motivated to allocate 
more than half of the benefit to themselves. For κ = 1, players can maximize their utility by achieving 
equal payoffs (si = sj). For the opposite case of κ > 1, corresponding to hyperaltruism, player i is moti-
vated to allocate more than half of the benefit to the other player.
Figure 6. A Status Quo Bias in Dictator Behavior. (a) Group-level mean offers of shocks across all 
dictators (vertical axis; N = 47), for each action frame (horizontal axis category). Solid black horizontal bars 
indicate the mean default offer under each frame. Upper dashed horizontal bars show the mean offers that 
would result from maximally selfish behaviour, lower dashed horizontal bars the mean offers that would 
result from maximally selfless behaviour. Mean offers were significantly higher in the Take frame than 
in the Give frame, consistent with a status quo bias. (b) Group-level mean net offers of money across all 
dictators (vertical axis; N = 25) under Give (G), Take (T) and Give or Take (G/T) action frames (horizontal 
axis category, individual bars), under both Gain and Loss (debt) frames (horizontal axis groupings). Here, 
taking money is equivalent to giving debt, and vice versa. Solid black horizontal bars indicate the mean 
default offer under each frame. Upper dashed horizontal bars show the mean offers that would result from 
maximally selfless behaviour, lower dashed horizontal bars the mean offers that would result from maximally 
selfish behaviour. A status quo effect is evident for money gains and losses (debt), whereby net offers were 
higher when the net default offer was high (Take frame for money gains and Give frame for money losses), 
compared with when the net default offer was low (Give frame for money gains and Take frame for money 
losses). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals generated by resampling the data 100,000 times with 
replacement. Asterisks indicate p values associated with two-tailed permutation tests; ***p< 0.001.
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We compared this model with an existing model based on social-welfare preferences, namely 
Charness-Rabin social preferences, which similarly assumes that people behave as if to maximize a 
weighted combination (in this case an average) of the payoffs of all players20. Rather than incorporating 
concave utility over individual payoffs, under Charness-Rabin preferences the weighted average is mod-
ulated by the existence of advantageous or disadvantageous inequality. We also tested two models based 
on social comparison, Fehr-Schmidt utility6 and the Equity, Reciprocity and Competition model (ERC)5. 
Under Fehr-Schmidt utility allocations are penalized in direct proportion to the degree of inequality 
(while allowing different slopes for advantageous and disadvantageous inequality) leading to linear ine-
quality aversion. Under ERC squared deviations from even utility spreading are penalized, leading to 
increasing marginal inequality aversion.
Of the models tested, only the social discounting model can theoretically incorporate both hyper-
altruism and increasing marginal inequality aversion, two key patterns observed in our data for pain. 
With the standard parameter bounds, Fehr-Schmidt utility accounts for neither finding, ERC accounts 
for non-linear inequality aversion, but not hyperaltruism and Charness-Rabin preferences are capable 
of incorporating hyperaltruism, but do not incorporate non-linear inequality aversion. We therefore 
hypothesized that the social discounting model would provide the best fit to the observed data. Since 
the behavioral data are consistent with a status quo bias, we modified each model to incorporate this 
effect, by assigning a cost to altering the status quo. Models were fitted on an individual subject basis 
by maximum likelihood, by means of a logistic function linking utilities with choice probabilities, and 
were compared using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The latter is an approximation to the 
Bayesian model evidence which favors models that account well for the observed data (in this case 
models with higher maximized likelihood), whilst penalizing model complexity (in this case models with 
more parameters). To reduce the number of possible models, money gains and losses were fitted jointly 
using the same set of parameters, which appeared justifiable given the relatively close correspondence of 
choices in these two conditions (Figs 5 and 6). (See Methods for detailed model specifications).
Consistent with predictions, the social discount model, with the addition of a status quo bias, was 
unequivocally the best fitting model at the group-level (highest maximum likelihood and lowest BIC) 
for both pain (Fig. 8a; BIC difference of 124 over the next best model, in this case Charness-Rabin social 
preferences with a status quo bias) and money (Fig. 9a; BIC difference of 152 over the next best model, in 
this case ERC with a status quo bias). The choice probabilities predicted by the model, formed by taking 
the mean of individual choice probabilities across subjects, are overlaid with the observed data for pain 
and money in Figs 8b and 9b respectively. For pain, mean κ = 1.17 (95% CI by resampling = 0.95–1.44; 
N = 47), indicating a non-significant trend at the group level towards assigning greater weight to others’ 
pain, i.e. hyperaltruism, in keeping with the behavioral findings above. For money, mean κ = 0.81 (95% 
Figure 7. Social Utility Functions Based on a Social Discounting Model. The total utility predicted by a 
social discounting model of the form shown in Eq. 1 (vertical axis, arbitrary units), is plotted as a function 
of the offer to the receiver (sj) in a dictator game with an endowment of 24 units ( = − )s s24i j . Two 
possible scenarios are shown, either a decreasing offer of painful shocks (horizontal axis, upper scale) or an 
increasing offer of money (horizontal axis, lower scale). The four lines represent different settings of the 
social discount parameter, κ, as labeled. In each case, ( ) ≡ ( )u s u si j , both given by the quadratic function 
( ) = −u s s bs2, where = .b 0 01. For κ = 1 the function has a maximum when allocations to both 
participants are equal ( = = ),s s 12i j  corresponding to symmetric inequality aversion. κ < 1 generates a 
preference for assigning more than half the benefit to oneself, while κ > 1 (hyperaltruism) generates a 
preference for assigning more than half the benefit to the receiver. For each parameter setting, moving away 
from one’s preferred allocation carries a non-linear (increasing marginal) cost.
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CI by resampling = 0.64–0.96, one-sample p = 0.0162; N = 25), indicating significantly self-oriented pref-
erences. Also in keeping with the preceding model-free analyses, mean κ for money was significantly 
lower than that for pain (p = 0.0158, two-tailed permutation test), supporting the conclusion of more 
altruistic choices for pain than for money.
Evaluation of Experienced Pain Allocations. By generating equivalent outcomes framed as either 
Non-Social (no information given about the other player’s allocation) or Social (players were informed 
of the other’s allocation), where the latter can be framed as resulting either from the choices made by 
the dictator (Social-Intentioned condition) or from the play of chance (Social-Chance condition), we 
examined the effects of inequality and perceived intentionality on the perception of pain. We predicted 
Figure 8. Model Fits to Pain Dictator Game Choices. (a) BIC values for the alternative models, either 
with status quo bias (light blue bars, right bar of each pair) or without (dark blue bars, left bar of each pair). 
The social discounting model provided the most parsimonious fit, indicated by the grey dot. (b) Maximum 
likelihood choice probabilities of the social discounting model, formed by taking the mean of the predicted 
choice probabilities across participants, are indicated by gray circles, and are overlaid with the observed 
choice probabilities as displayed in Fig. 4, indicated by blue triangles for choices to take on pain and blue 
circles for choices to give pain. As in Fig. 4, a single data point represents a mean choice probability across 
47 participants and error bars are 95% confidence intervals around the mean, generated by re-sampling the 
data 100,000 times with replacement.
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that advantageous inequality would reduce and disadvantageous inequality increase pain perception. 
We also predicted that perceived intentionality, in the Social-Intentioned condition, would amplify this 
effect, resulting in an effect of intentioned advantageous inequality to reduce pain perception, termed a 
‘kindness effect’ and an effect of intentioned disadvantageous inequality to increase it, termed a ‘mean-
ness effect’.
Full ratings data was available from 50 subjects, 25 dictators and 25 receivers. We expected to find 
that receiving more shocks at a given current level would increase the rated intensity of the pain, owing 
Figure 9. Model Fits to Money Dictator Game Choices. (a) BIC values for the alternative models, either 
with status quo bias (light green bars, right bar of each pair) or without (dark green bars, left bar of each 
pair). The social discounting model provided the most parsimonious fit, indicated by the grey dot. (b) 
Maximum likelihood choice probabilities of the social discounting model, formed by taking the mean of 
the predicted choice probabilities across participants, are indicated by gray circles, and are overlaid with 
the observed choice probabilities as displayed in Fig. 5, indicated by green diamonds for choices to take 
money, purple triangles for choices to give debt, green squares for choices to give money and purple circles 
for choices to take on debt. As in Fig. 5, a single data point represents a mean choice probability across 25 
participants and error bars are 95% confidence intervals around the mean, generated by re-sampling the data 
100,000 times with replacement.
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to sensitization from one shock to the next. Indeed, a repeated measures ANOVA on intensity rat-
ings across Non-Social with Social-Chance conditions across all subjects revealed a significant main 
effect of number-of-shocks (F(2,98) = 4.238, p = 0.017; partial η2 = 0.08). We predicted that priming 
inequality in the Social-Chance condition would increase the slope of this relationship, manifest as an 
interaction between condition and number of shocks. In fact we found no evidence for the predicted 
number-of-shocks by condition interaction (F(2, 98) = 0.045, p = 0.956), and no significant main effect 
of condition (F(1,49) = 0.297, p = 0.588), suggesting that inequality per se did not influence pain rat-
ings (Fig.  10). However, comparison of intensity ratings from receivers (N = 25) in Social-Chance and 
Social-Intentioned conditions did show the predicted number-of-shocks by condition interaction (F(2, 
48) = 11.657, p < 0.001, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected), as well as a main effect of number-of-shocks 
(F(2,48) = 8.026, p = 0.004, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected;) and no significant main effect of condition 
(F(1,24) = 1.218, p = 0.281), indicating that perceiving the other participant as responsible for shock 
allocations significantly influenced pain perception. Pairwise comparisons revealed this effect was driven 
by lower intensity ratings in the Social-Intentioned condition for 6 shocks (mean rating difference = 0.645 
points on VAS, 95% CI of the difference [0.15 1.13]; t(24) = 2.72, p = 0.012, two-tailed paired test) whilst 
intensity ratings for 18 shocks did not differ significantly between the two conditions (mean rating differ-
ence = 0.046 points on VAS, 95% CI of the difference [− 0.22 0.32]; t(24) = 0.351, p > 0.250), indicating 
a significant ‘kindness effect’, but no significant ‘meanness effect’ (Fig. 10).
Finally, despite the absence of a significant effect of inequality on pain perception at the group level, 
we nevertheless tested an hypothesis that a putative effect of inequality on pain perception in dictators 
might be a function of the degree of altruism exhibited in choices to allocate pain. In particular we pre-
dicted that less altruistic participants would show a greater effect of disadvantageous pain inequality on 
pain perception. However we found no significant correlation between dictators’ social discount factor, 
κ , and the difference in subjective pain ratings of 18 shocks between the Non-Social and Social-Chance 
conditions (Spearman rho = − 0.11, p > 0.250).
Figure 10. Rated Pain Intensity. Mean pain intensity ratings across participants on a 10-point visual 
analogue scale (VAS) for the Non-Social condition (all participants, N = 50, gray squares) the Social-
Chance condition (all participants, N = 50, red circles) and the Social-Intentioned condition (split into 
dictators, indicated by yellow diamonds and receivers, indicated by blue triangles, N = 25 in each group). 
Data are modelled as a concave psychophysical function of number of shocks (dashed and dotted lines, 
see Supporting Results). Error bars represent one standard error above and below the mean. In the Social-
Intentioned condition, when dictators behaved altruistically, allocating only 6 out a possible 24 shocks to the 
receiver, this significantly reduced pain perception relative to the other two conditions.
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Discussion
Psychologists have long been interested in the circumstances under which people are willing to cause 
or relieve others’ pain. The experiments of Stanley Milgram (unacceptable by many ethical standards, 
including those of the time35) reported that under specific conditions, designed to encourage obedience 
to the wishes of the experimenter, people could be induced to cause high levels of pain to others36,37. 
However numerous studies that have hitherto attracted less attention illustrate that humans are generally 
reluctant to actively harm others38,39, show empathic responses to others’ pain13–15, and even choose to 
suffer pain, or pay money themselves to avoid causing pain to others16,17,40–41. These studies combine to 
suggest that people find others’ pain intrinsically aversive. Separately, economists have sought to quantify 
altruistic human behavior through formal games, finding that many people prefer to share money with 
others, even when there is no financial reward for doing so10, a behavior that has often been character-
ised as a preference for equality. Here we integrate these disparate lines of research, by formalizing the 
transfer of both pain and money between individuals in economic terms using a modified dictator game.
We found that being allocated more pain than others motivated people to transfer pain to others, 
while being allocated less pain than others motivated people to take on others’ pain, consistent with 
a preference for equal allocations of pain. Furthermore, increases in pain inequality had an increasing 
effect on the motivation to redress inequality. In psychological terms this can be viewed in terms of drive 
reduction: the further one is from a desirable goal, the stronger the motivation to act42,43. In economic 
terms this finding indicates an increasing marginal aversion to inequality5,8. We showed that this behav-
ior can result from a more fundamental principle of diminishing marginal utility (or in psychological 
terms, satiety) if it is assumed that social utility is given by a sum of individual utilities, weighted by 
social discount factors. If people have some degree of concern for others, then diminishing marginal util-
ity creates a motive to donate to those who have least, since they will benefit most from increases in util-
ity44. For pain, the model assumes increasing marginal disutility, such that the motive to share pain arises 
directly from the escalating cost of pain to each individual. Put simply, those in greatest pain are seen as 
being in the greatest need of reductions in pain. An appealing feature of this model is that it derives a 
higher-order social preference (for equality) from a more basic psychophysical principle (satiety).
We termed the above model ‘social discounting’ since it is formally equivalent to conventional eco-
nomic models of intertemporal choice, which combine an instantaneous utility function with a temporal 
discount factor45,46. Several previous reports have proposed that social and delay discounting can be 
considered formally equivalent, in support of which people discount delayed rewards and rewards given 
to individuals at increasing degrees of social distance from themselves according to the same hyper-
bolic form47–51. Furthermore, when asked to allocate reward, or relief from pain, over more than one 
time period, many people show a preference for spreading the benefits evenly52. This behavior can be 
accounted for by assuming diminishing marginal utility for rewards at each discrete time point, and as 
shown here is formally analogous to the tendency to spread utility across individuals53. An important 
direction for future research will be to examine whether these behaviors correlate across individuals, 
consistent with their hypothesized common origin in non-linear utility.
Unlike models based exclusively on social comparison, the social discounting model accounts for the 
observation that people will sacrifice decreases in equality for gains in efficiency (the total payoff to all 
players)10. However, in its current form the model cannot account for the opposite behavior, namely sac-
rifices in efficiency for the sake of achieving equality54. The model shown here might feasibly be extended 
to incorporate this behavior, by adding a direct social comparison term:
κ λ( , ) = ( ) + ( ) + ( − ) ( )U s s u s u s u s s 2SD i j i i j j i i j
The first and second terms are exactly as shown in Equation 1. The first term corresponds to self-interest 
and the second to concern for others; together, through the concavity of u(s), these terms lead to a pref-
erence for spreading utility across individuals, which for egalitarian preferences (κ = 1, can be interpreted 
either as “my need is greater than yours”, in the case of disadvantageous inequality or “your need is 
greater than mine”, in the case of advantageous inequality. The third term embodies a specific benefit to 
having more than others (i.e. ‘competition’); by contrast to the first two terms, this term motivates actions 
which deprive others of benefit simply to improve one’s own relative standing, and corresponds to a spe-
cific meaning of ‘envy’ in psychodynamic theory55. A fourth term might also be added to represent the 
direct cost of being better off than others, however this is arguably unnecessary, since concrete instances 
of people deliberately destroying their own resources to make others feel better are relatively rare.
We found that, for monetary outcomes, people more frequently acted to correct disadvantageous as 
compared with advantageous inequality, as seen in previous findings where disadvantageous monetary 
inequality has a larger motivating effect8. For pain, however, we found no significant degree of asymme-
try. Consistent with this participants were significantly more altruistic when in receipt of an allocation of 
pain than when allocating money. We also observed hyperaltruism for pain, whereby close to a third of 
participants (15 out of 47, 32%) retained more than half the shocks across all choices. This pattern was 
readily modeled by allowing the weighting given to others’ utility to exceed that given to one’s own utility. 
The prevalence of hyperaltruistic behavior seen here is closely comparable to that previously reported 
for a conventional dictator game with pain, which found that 16 out of 54 (30%) participants allocated 
less than half of the painful cold immersion time to the other participant18. (Notably both proportions 
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are markedly lower than the prevalence of hyperaltruism in a recent study which required participants 
to trade off pain and money, where over half of participants displayed hyperaltruism19. One explanation 
for this discrepancy would be that, in addition to a baseline hyperaltruistic tendency for pain in some 
individuals, people are specifically reluctant to accept monetary profit from others’ pain).
Why people appear to show greater altruism when allocating pain as compared with money remains 
unclear. Our findings demonstrate a reduced form estimate of this effect. We do not identify structural 
estimates of the impact of various parameters, but we can speculate about mechanisms based on these 
data. One possibility is that, while people frequently exchange money in everyday life, exchanging pain is 
more unusual. This might lead people to be be more uncertain about others’ responses to pain compared 
to their responses to money and therefore behave more altruistically when allocating pain as a precaution 
against provoking an unexpectedly severe response19. Of course the current experiment does not permit 
reciprocity, but it seems likely that altruism in dictator games in part reflects the accumulated experi-
ence of participants that social interactions are almost always reciprocal56. A second possibility is that a 
particular aversion to causing pain in others might arise in a social norm effect. Though there are many 
circumstances under which it is acceptable to deprive others of money, causing physical harm to others 
is rarely deemed acceptable. Finally it is possible that the findings here do not truly reflect intrinsically 
greater altruism for pain than for money, but are peculiar to our experimental scenario. For example, 
participants might have wished to signal to the experimenter or to the other participant that they were 
capable of enduring pain, or that they were particularly charitable. In monetary dictator games obscuring 
the link between the dictator’s choices and the resulting outcomes engenders more selfish behavior12,56–58, 
and further work ought to examine whether the apparent increase in altruism seen for pain survives in 
cases where the dictator’s actions are less transparent, for example where random variability is added 
to the dictator’s offers59. Again, these are at present speculations and we hope they stimulate further 
research to unpick the underlying mechanisms. We note that a previous study with a different design 
also finds greater altruism for pain than money18, though similar issues might apply to this finding also.
Finally, by implementing selected allocations for real, we were able to examine the effects of inequality 
and perceived intentionality on the perception of pain itself. Although we found no significant influence 
of inequality per se on pain perception, we did observe a ‘kindness effect’, whereby participants rated a 
low number of shocks as less intense when they believed that the other participant had chosen to accept 
a high number of shocks at the same time, thus enduring extra pain for their benefit. This finding may 
reflect participants’ perception of being in the presence of a supportive other, consistent with existing 
findings that the presence of a familiar conspecific reduces pain responses in both humans60 and ani-
mals61,62 Lending support to this idea, one previous study found that pain chosen by another participant 
was rated as less severe if the receiver believed that the other participant would increase their (the receiv-
er’s) monetary payment by giving pain, rather than believing that the other had no apparent motive for 
giving pain30.
Unlike previous studies we found no evidence for the converse (‘meanness’) effect, namely an effect 
of selfish behavior on the part of the dictator to increase pain perception for the receiver30,31. An expla-
nation for this null result might be that in the current study intentioned-inequality was in the number 
of shocks; effects of intentioned-inequality on subjective intensity ratings might therefore be expected 
to resemble the effect of increasing or decreasing the number of shocks. Subjective intensity ratings did 
increase as a function of the number of shocks (consistent with sensitization), however this relationship 
saturated at higher numbers of shocks. Under this account a meanness effect would be equivalent to 
increasing the number of shocks from an already high level, with little resulting effect on pain perception. 
To formalize this hypothesis we modeled intensity ratings as a concave psychophysical function of num-
ber of shocks, using a Weibull function with two parameters, asymptote, A, and latency, L, constrained 
to pass through the origin:
= ( − ) ( )
−Rating A e1 3
n
L
Least squares fits of this function, displayed in Fig. 10, illustrate that the saturation hypothesis appears 
plausible.
A key question for future research is whether relative deprivation or suffering in one modality alters 
responses to inequality in other modalities. There is already evidence to support this suggestion. For 
example, Mancini and colleagues report that experiencing pain increases self-oriented behavior in a 
one-shot ultimatum game54, and that, somewhat in opposition to the kindess effect shown here, per-
ceived monetary unfairness reduces neural responses to pain63. Such generalization across domains is 
not incongruent with a wider societal observation that relative poverty correlates with both violent and 
acquisitive criminal behavior3,64,65.
Materials and Methods
Participants and Role Allocation. We recruited 78 participants (46 female) from the University 
College London Psychology Subject Pool. A power calculation based on a Student’s t-distribution indi-
cated that a sample size of 34 would be required to detect a medium sized effect (Cohen’s d = 0.5), while 
a sample size of 15 would be required to detect a large effect (Cohen’s d = 0.8) at 80% power66. The 
primary purpose of this study was to examine how people choose to distribute pain, and their responses 
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to unequal allocations of pain. We sought to examine whether hyperaltruism and inequality aversion 
would both manifest in such choices. We therefore aimed to elicit pain dictator game choices from at 
least 35 participants. The final sample size easily exceeded this total (N = 47; 29 female, mean age 27.7 
years, s.d. 8.5 years).
Given that the experimental design differs from a standard dictator game setup, we tested the same 
design with monetary choices, to allow fair comparison between responses to pain and money inequal-
ity. We therefore elicited monetary choices from a subset of the same participants who were willing and 
available to take part in this component of the study. A monetary questionnaire was issued at a later date 
to these 47 participants; here the sample size was determined by the number responding to this request 
(N = 25; 16 female, mean age 29.6 years, s.d. 11.6 years). Of the 47 participants completing pain dictator 
game games, 31 took part in the experiential component of the study. For this component, we separately 
recruited 31 participants to act as ‘receivers’. Due to experimenter error, datasets from 6 of these 31 pairs 
were incomplete, resulting in full experiential data from 25 pairs (N = 50; 30 female, mean age 27.8, s.d. 
10.2). Dictators and receivers did not actually meet each other, but each was briefed that they would 
be interacting with another participant in an adjacent testing room through an intranet link; they were 
informed that there was no opportunity for reciprocity. Experiments were carried out at the Wellcome 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London. Participants were compensated for their 
participation at a rate of £10 per hour.
Ethics Statement. All participants gave full informed consent prior to the experiment. After the 
experiment participants were debriefed and given the opportunity to provide feedback. The study proce-
dure was approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Ethics no. 3953_001), and procedures were 
carried out in accordance with the approved guidelines.
Pain Stimuli. Throughout the experiment each participant sat in front of a computer monitor while 
choice options were presented on-screen, and indicated their decisions using the keyboard. The pres-
entation package COGENT 2000 (University College London) was used for stimulus presentation and 
response acquisition. Electrical stimuli were delivered using a DS5 Digitimer (Letchworth Garden City, 
England) constant current stimulator. A single “shock” consisted of a train of seven 10ms square-wave 
pulses delivered at 40ms intervals. When multiple shocks were delivered these were spaced 250 ms apart. 
After providing consent, participants underwent a standardized thresholding procedure, which allowed 
selection of shock intensities corresponding to an equivalent subjective level of discomfort for each par-
ticipant67,68. Participants were first asked to rate the pain associated with shocks of varying intensities 
using a 10-point visual analogue scale (VAS). Firstly two iterations of a stochastic increasing current 
staircase procedure were used to identify the maximum intensity the participant felt they could tol-
erate for the purposes of the experiment. Participants were reassured that during the experiment all 
stimuli would be below their maximum tolerance. Secondly participants rated a randomized sequence 
of sub-maximal shock intensities. The least-squares fit of a psychophysical function (a three-parameter 
Weibull distribution) describing the subjective ratings at each current level was determined for each 
participant, and inverted to determine current levels (in mA) for use during the experiment, which 
corresponded to ratings of 5/10 and 8/10 respectively.
Dictator Game Choices. Dictator game choices were elicited through an online interface (Qualtrics.
com; Provo, UT); on each the computer suggested a default allocation of 24 shocks between dictator and 
receiver, and the dictator chose whether to alter this allocation, or leave it unchanged (Fig. 1). Dictators 
were informed that the subjective intensity level of the shocks would vary between 4/10 and 8/10 on 
a VAS, but that the subjective level for themselves and the other player would always be the same on 
a given trial. In a Give or Take condition default allocations (number of shocks for the dictator listed 
first) were [18–6], [12–12] or [6–18]. The dictator chose whether to give 6 shocks to the receiver from 
their own allocation, to take 6 shocks from the receiver’s allocation (which would be added to their own 
allocation) or to leave the allocation unchanged. In a Give condition default allocations were [24–0], 
[18–6], [12–12] or [6–18]. The dictator chose whether to give 6 shocks of their shocks to the receiver or 
to leave the default allocation unchanged. In a Take condition default allocations were [18–6], [12–12], 
[6–18] or [0–24]. The dictator chose whether to take 6 shocks from the receiver’s allocation, or to leave 
the allocation unchanged. Notably equivalent outcomes were attainable in all frames. Each choice option 
was presented twice, creating 22 choices in total. Dictators were informed that a selection of their choices 
would be played for real in the experiential part of the experiment, should they consent to take part. The 
order of conditions and trials within conditions was randomized.
In a follow-up experiment we elicited equivalent choices with money in a subset of the same par-
ticipants, where the numbers of shocks were replaced with quantities of money in pounds sterling. In 
a Money Gain condition participants were told that they had won a prize of £24 between themselves 
and the other participant. On each choice the computer suggested a default allocation for the money 
and the dictator chose to either alter this allocation, or leave it unchanged. In a Money Loss condition 
participants were informed that they and the other participant had each won a prize of £24, however 
that they must also pay a debt of £24 between them both. Net allocations in the Money Loss condition 
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were equivalent to the Money Gain condition. Participants were informed that we would randomly select 
some choices from the entire set of choices made by all participants to be paid out for real, which we 
honored.
Experiential Phase. To examine the effects of inequality and intentionality on the subjective expe-
rience of pain, selected shock allocations were played for real in the laboratory. This phase consisted 
of three types of trial (Fig.  2). On ‘Shocks for You: Chance’ (the Non-Social-Chance condition) trials 
participants were informed that they would receive either 6, 12 or 18 shocks, which would be randomly 
assigned to them by the computer. On ‘Split Shocks: Chance’ trials (the Social-Chance condition) partici-
pants were informed that 24 shocks would be split between themselves and the other participant, accord-
ing to one of three possible allocations [6–18], [12–12] or [18–6], which would be randomly selected by 
the computer. Finally a third type of trial (forming the Social-Intentioned condition) was referred to as 
‘Split Shocks: You Decide’ for the dictator and ‘Split Shocks: Other Player Decides’ for the receiver. The 
receiver was informed that the dictator had chosen allocations of shocks in advance, and that on each 
trial of this type one of the dictator’s chosen allocations would be implemented. Dictators were informed 
that on each trial of this type one of their previously chosen allocations would be implemented, and that 
each allocation may be implemented more than once.
Both players were told that the intensity of the shocks could vary from trial to trial and that whilst 
they would not be told the intensity, the subjective level of the shocks for themselves and their partner 
would always be the same (both players would be told the number of shocks they were due to receive). 
All dictators made several choices resulting in the three allocations 6–18, 12–12 and 18–6 shocks. In fact, 
so as to control for context effects in the perception of pain, these three outcomes were selected with 
equal probability in both the Social-Intentioned and Social-Chance conditions. Similarly in the Non-Social 
condition, participants received 6, 12 or 18 shock with equal probability. Although participants were not 
informed of this sampling process, they were otherwise given faithful information regarding the setup.
The three trial types (conditions) were interleaved in 6 short blocks of 12 trials each. Within each 
condition, the three possible allocations of shocks were repeated twice at each of two different inten-
sity levels (5/10 and 8/10). The order of conditions and of trials within each condition was randomly 
counterbalanced. The outcome allocation on each trial was indicated by a pie chart. In Non-Social and 
Social-Chance conditions, this was preceded by a “roulette-wheel” effect, emphasizing that the computer 
was randomly selecting the shocks. After the outcome was displayed shocks were administered to both 
players accordingly.
In the first session, after shock delivery each player rated the intensity of the shocks on a visual ana-
logue scale. Immediately afterwards participants’ willingness-to-pay to avoid the shocks was obtained by 
means of a first-price “auction” (not shown in Fig. 2, see Supporting Supporting Results)69. Participants 
were endowed with 40 pence on each trial and were asked to indicate their willingness to pay from this 
endowment to avoid three repeats of their allocated shocks. On one in ten randomly selected trials their 
bid was compared to a market price, sampled from a uniform distribution in the range of 0–40 pence. 
If the participant’s bid exceeded the market price, they would avoid repeated instances of the allocated 
shocks, and would pay the amount they bid; otherwise they would receive three repeats of their allo-
cation of shocks and would pay nothing. Participants took home as a “bonus” any money which they 
did not spend on these auction trials. Participants were informed that their bids only affected their own 
shocks, and did not alter the other participant’s shocks. In a second session, participants rated the fairness 
of the outcomes, the extent to which they perceived the other player to be responsible for the allocation 
and the extent to which they felt inclined to punish the other player for the allocation, each on a VAS 
ranging from 0 to 100 (see Supporting Results).
Statistical Tests and Significance Thresholds. To test statistical hypotheses without mak-
ing assumptions about the sampling distribution of the data we generated sampling distributions 
non-parametrically, by permutation testing. For one-sample tests this entailed randomly resampling the 
data with replacement, for two sample tests this entailed randomly reassigning the observed data to 
either of the comparison condition and computing the sample mean difference. To construct the sam-
pling distribution 100,000 samples were taken in each case. We performed two-tailed tests throughout, 
with a standard significance threshold of α = 0.05. Where relevant we corrected for multiple comparisons 
by Bonferroni correction.
Model Specification and Fitting. We tested alternative social valuation models for the choices made 
by the dictators. Specifically, we tested the social discounting model described above against three exist-
ing social utility models: Fehr-Schmidt utility6, Charness-Rabin social preferences20, and the Equity, 
Reciprocity and Competition model (ERC)5. The social discounting model assumed the form shown in 
Eq. (1). The utility functions over individual payoffs were assumed to be identical, such that ( ) ≡ ( )u s u si j , 
both given by the quadratic function ( ) = −u s s bs 2, where b = 0.01.
The Fehr-Schmidt model penalizes unequal allocations, with separate penalties for advantageous ine-
quality and disadvantageous inequality:
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α β( , ) = − − , − − , ( )U s s s s s s smax { 0} max{ 0} 4FS i j i j i i j
( , )U s sFS i j  is a social utility function governing the utility to player i of an allocation with payoff si to 
player i and sj to player j, and α parameterizes the linear effect of disadvantageous inequity, β the effect 
of advantageous inequity. As is conventional, parameter bounds were set such that α ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
The ERC model also implements a penalty for unequal payoffs, though in a non-linear manner, 
achieved by penalizing squared deviations from an even distribution of payoffs:
σ( , ) = ⋅ + ⋅ ( − . ) ( )U s s s a
b
2
0 5 5
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i j i i
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where σi is player i’s share of the total payoff:
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s
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i
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The parameter a weights self-oriented preferences, while b determines the contribution of inequality 
aversion; both parameters were bounded to be zero or positive.
Charness-Rabin social preferences assume that people behave as if to maximize a flexible weighted 
average of the payoffs of all players, where the weightings reflect the existence of advantageous or disad-
vantageous inequity as well as the effect of intentionality. For the two-person case:
ρ σ θ ρ σ θ( , ) = ( + + ) ⋅ + ( − − − ) ⋅ ( )U s s r s q s r s q s1 7CR i j j i
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In this case q was set to zero, making θ redundant; the remaining weighting factors ρ and σ were bounded 
between zero and one.
All four models above were modified by adding a status quo bias, simply a fixed cost, x, associated 
with changing the allocation, such that for each model:
( , | ) =


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

( , | ) − ≠
( , | ) ( )
U s s a
U s s a q if a
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0
11
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where a = 0 denotes accepting the default.
Model fitting was by maximum likelihood estimation; a standard logistic sigmoid (softmax function) 
was used to transform the social utilities of the allocations resulting from different actions into corre-
sponding probability of choosing a particular action a, over alternative actions a′ :
β
β
( ) =
( ⋅ ( , | ))
∑ ( ⋅ ( , | ′)) ( )′
p choose a
U s s a
U s s a
exp
exp 12
i j
a i j
Here β is the inverse temperature parameter, equivalent to a logistic regression weight. With higher values 
of β behavior becomes more deterministic for choosing the allocation with higher utility. Constrained 
non-linear optimization was used in Matlab (Mathworks, MA, USA), to find model parameters which 
minimized the negative log likelihood of subjects’ choices. To avoid convergence on local minima, the 
optimizer was run within a random multi-started overlay with 1000 starting points drawn from a uni-
form distribution within the parameter bounds (RMsearch). Models were compared using the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC), which is an approximation to the Bayesian model evidence, favoring mod-
els that provide a close correspondence to the data while penalizing model complexity70:
= − + ( ) ( )BIC L kln n2 13
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where L is the maximized group level log likelihood (formed by summing individual log likelihoods), k 
is the total number of fitted model parameters (summed across subjects) and n is the total number of 
fitted data points (summed across subjects). Lower values of BIC indicate a more parsimonious model fit.
Survey Measures. Participants also completed a 20-item Paranoia Scale71, a 40-item Empathy Quotient 
questionnaire72, a Justice Sensitivity Scale (Victim and Perpetrator sensitivity)73 and a Vengeance Scale74 
(see Supporting Results).
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